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THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
IN CHICAGO
by ILYAS LAKADA

M

r. and Mrs. Smith thought they were living the American dream. As
immigrants to the United States, they longed to own their own home
some day. The Joneses were in a similar situation. They too imagined that
investing in real estate would offer some financial stability for their retirement.
But when the market collapsed in 2008, their hopes were shattered as they lost
what little remained of their retirement savings. The Smiths and Joneses are
just a handful of stories of homeowners desperately trying to save their homes
and property from foreclosure, only to find that the laws meant to help them
offer little shelter.
In 2010, the Chicagoland area saw a near 16 percent increase in foreclosure
related filings.1 In the third quarter of 2010, Chicago saw a 35 percent increase
with one in 84 properties receiving a notice of foreclosure.2 Even more star-
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tling, in 2010 Chicago had the second-highest number of bank repossessions,
increasing by 20 percent from the year previous to 45,555.3 These statistics
reveal that Chicago has not been immune to the nationwide foreclosure crisis.
Under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act (the Act), the term “foreclosure”
means “to terminate legal and equitable interests in real estate” due to nonpayment of a loan.4 The nationwide foreclosure epidemic can trace its roots
back to 2008.5 Rising unemployment, consistent underemployment, and increasing loan interest rates due to bait-and-switch tactics of mortgage brokers
were all contributory factors to the crisis.6
Economists posit that the negative equity of current homeowners, or homeowners who owe more on their house than it is currently worth (sometimes
referred to as being underwater), is adding fuel to the fire.7,8 In Chicago alone,
nearly 386,000, or 25 percent of the area’s 1.5 million homeowners, report
being underwater.9 These homeowners often feel that it is more economically
prudent to walk away than to simply throw good money after bad.
Under the Act, a homeowner may also opt to hand the deed of the house to
the lender, known as a “deed-in-lieu”10 or a “consent foreclosure.”11 The
homeowner is shielded from any personal liability that may have resulted from
a foreclosure case.12
Many homeowners, however, attempt to mitigate any such outcome by first
working with the lender. Under President Obama’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), qualified borrowers may be eligible to have their
loan payments reduced to 31 percent of their gross income through interest
rate reductions and an extension of the amortization period.13 Troubled homeowners also have the option of a “short sale.”14 In a short sale transaction, the
homeowner places his home on the market and, if a prospective buyer offers
less than the total loan due, the bank may accept the reduced settlement. Congress has also incentivized short sales by refusing to tax the principal amount
that may have been forgiven—up to $2 million.15
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A HOMEOWNER’S PERSPECTIVE

In June of 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Smith purchased a brick two-flat building in
the North Mayfair community of Chicago for $431,000.16 The couple had
decent jobs and there was a rental unit that could help offset any expenses.17 In
2008, however, Mr. and Mrs. Smith started to experience difficulties.18 Their
tenant lost her job and moved out to live with another family member.19 Mr.
Smith was deemed disabled and had to quit his job, earning a small Social
Security disability payment.20
Unable to make ends meet, the couple decided to charge their nearly $3,600
interest-only monthly loan payment on their credit card.21 “We didn’t know
what else to do . . . my English is limited and I couldn’t afford a lawyer,”
stated Ms. Smith while wiping away tears.22 “My husband would wake up in
the middle of night scared . . . ‘what about the children’s school?’”23 The
Smiths had two children in a nearby magnet elementary school and did not
want to transfer them to another general enrollment school.24
Then, in January 2009, with his medical condition worsening and the household finances in turmoil, Mr. Smith passed away due to a stroke.25 With the
assistance of a family member, Mrs. Smith contacted her lender, JPMorgan
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Chase.26 At first, “they actually wanted me to miss some payments,” complained Mrs. Smith.27 Eventually she did, and formally applied for a loan
modification.28 For a year, her lender lost documents, gave incorrect information, and rejected her trial payment plans.29 “I didn’t understand. First they
said ‘miss some payments.’ Then, they said ‘as long as you make your trial
payments, you’ll be guaranteed a permanent reduced payment.’ It never
happened.”30
She applied for a modification three times only to be rejected each time.31 No
formal reason was given.32 She has written to the U.S. Treasury Department
and Freddie Mac (the original investor of the loan) but has not received a
response.33 Finally, on the advice of a family member, she “short-sold” her
home in December 2010.34 “I am relieved [that the loan is gone] but upset—
this was designed to help people like me. Why didn’t they help? Why did they
lie to me for two years? I placed so much hope in them.”35
AN INVESTOR’S PERSPECTIVE

Mr. Jones, on the other hand, is considered a strategic-defaulter. In April
2006, he and his wife purchased a one-bedroom condominium unit for nearly
$300,000 in the Gold Coast neighborhood of Chicago.36 At the time, the
developer offered to pay the first two years of the interest-only loan payment.
Mr. Jones also had a tenant there.37 “It was great. We had no out-of-pocket
cost and the market was rising,” said Mr. Jones.38 “The unit next door sold for
$400,000 a year later.”39
But, in 2009, Mr. Jones noticed values were declining rapidly.40 Other unit
owners were selling their condos for nearly 50 percent less than what Mr. Jones
purchased his unit for.41 “What’s the point?” said Mr. Jones.42 “Why should I
make payments on something that is never going to come back?”43 Mr. Jones
now claims that the price of his unit has further declined to less than
$100,000. He contacted his lender, Citibank.44 “The bank’s response was
‘Since you don’t live there, you don’t qualify,’” said an angered Mr. Jones.45
The couple submitted documentation about the situation, but the bank would
not consider the information.46 “I told them the keys are in the mail,” said Mr.
Jones.47 When asked about the moral hazard of strategically defaulting, he
responded, “If they threw me a bone, I would have considered. But they’re not
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helping anybody, even the people who are living in their houses. Why should
we then care about morals? What about the bank’s morals? No doubt I was in
over my head, but just give me some hope.”48
LOCAL SOLUTIONS

With the national HAMP program failing to net mortgage modifications for
borrowers like the Smiths or Joneses, local governments are trying to fill the
gap, as foreclosures have a tremendous negative impact on the local economy.49 In Cook County, the Chancery Division created the Cook County
Foreclosure Mediation program to bring to homeowners and lenders together
to work out a solution.50 The program, however, has had only mild success
with “less than ten percent” of eligible homeowners participating.51
In the state capitol, lawmakers have proposed legislation including a “Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Fee” applied to purchasers of foreclosed homes,
known in the industry as Real Estate Owned properties (REOs).52 In Chicago,
similar legislation was dubbed the “Sweet Home Ordinance,” which would use
money from tax-increment financing districts to create affordable housing
from REOs.53 The Community Investment Corporation in Chicago (CIC) has
begun such projects, taking on large-scale REOs and converting them into
affordable housing units.54
CIC’s president Jack Markowski wishes to take the program further and work
with struggling homeowners, lenders, and investors to convert occupied homes
into affordable housing.55 Nonetheless, it is clear, without government support, the foreclosure crisis in Chicago and nationwide will continue to worsen.
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